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PROCEDURE
EVIDENCE
Francis C. Sullivan*
IMPEACHMENT - PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS
In State v. Jackson,' an armed robbery case, the defense used
two letters to impeach the authors, the victims of the robbery
who were offered as state's witnesses. On cross-examination each
of the witnesses distinctly admitted making the prior inconsistent
statements contained in the letters. The defense then sought to
introduce the letters into evidence, but the objection of the state
to the admission of the letters was sustained by the trial judge.
In sustaining the ruling of the trial court, the Supreme Court
held that "the letters offered in evidence were inadmissible be-
cause it is only when the witness does not distinctly admit the
making of the statement contradictory to his testimony that evi-
dence of such a statement is admissible. ' 2
The applicable statute provides: "If the witness does not
distinctly admit making such [contradictory] statement, evi-
dence that he did make it is admissible."'3 In the instant case the
court adhered to its prior holdings which have the effect of
drawing a negative inference from the quoted portion of the
statute. As early as 1896, long prior to the adoption of the
present statute, the Supreme Court established this rule,4 but at
no time has the rationale been examined.
The theory underlying impeachment by prior inconsistent
statement is that the trier of fact may doubt the veracity of
the witness when presented with the fact that the witness has
made conflicting statements concerning the same matter. Under
this view, the witness is impeached at the time that he is shown
to have made the conflicting statements, and this undoubtedly
occurs when the witness clearly admits making the prior incon-
sistent statement. Only when the witness denies making the
prior statement or makes an ambiguous response such as "I
don't know" or "I don't remember"," is it necessary to complete
the impeachment by proof that the witness in fact made the
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 248 La. 919, 183 So. 2d 305 (1966).
2. Id. at 922, 183 So. 2d at 306.
3. LA. R.S. 15:493 (1950), as amended, La. Ats 1952, No. 180, § 1.
4. State v. Goodbier, 48 La. Ann. 770, 19 So. 755 (1896).
5. State v. Johnson, 47 La. Ann. 1225, 17 So. 789 (1895).
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prior inconsistent statement. The essential question, then, is
whether the prior inconsistent statement was made, and not
which statement is true.
When the impeachment has been completed by the admission
of the witness, most courts appear to share the Louisiana view
that no further evidence of the prior statement is admissible.6
Wigmore has sharply criticized this view, taking the position
that it is unfair to the impeaching party to restrict him to this
"unemphatic mode" of impeachment. 7 In the usual criminal case,
one of the most valuable weapons available to the defense is the
ability to impeach the state's witnesses by prior inconsistent
statements. Where the witness admits making a prior incon-
sistent statement and thereby can foreclose further inquiry and
introduction into evidence of the prior statement, there is serious
question as to whether the impeachment will have much meaning
for the jury when determining the credibility to be assigned to
the particular witness. It should be remembered that impeach-
ment is not merely a legal formality, but is a means of enabling
the trier of fact to properly evaluate the evidence presented at
the trial.
IMPEACHMENT - PRIOR CONVICTIONS
The law is clear that a witness in a Louisiana criminal case
may be impeached by a showing that he has been convicted of a
crime.8 The rule applies equally to a defendant who chooses to
testify in his own behalf. In State v. Perkins,9 the defendant,
charged with negligent homicide, testified and was then asked
the following question on cross-examination: "This is not the
first stop sign you have ever run, is it Mrs. Perkins ?" The de-
fense objected on the ground that evidence of other traffic vio-
lations was inadmissible, but the court overruled the objection,
stating: "The objection will be overruled if it has reference to a
6. See McCouMIcK, EVIDFNCE § S37 (1954).
7. 3 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 1037 (3d ed. 1940).
8. LA. R.S. 15:495 (Supp. 1952), provides: "Evidence of conviction of crime,
but not of arrest, indictment or prosecution, is admissible for the purpose of
impeaching the credibility of the witness, but before evidence of such former con-
viction can be adduced from any other source than the witness whose credibility
is to be impeached, he must have been questioned on cross-examination as to such
conviction, and have failed distinctly to admit the same; and no witness, whether
he be defendant or not, can be asked on cross-examination whether or not he has
ever been indicted or arrested, and can only be questioned as to conviction, and
as provided herein."
9. 248 La. 293, 178 So. 2d 255 (1965).
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prior offense when she was an adult." Later in the course of
its cross-examination of the defendant, the prosecution, after a
caution by the trial judge to interrogate as to convictions only,
asked the defendant if she had been convicted in the City Court
for reckless driving, knowing that a new trial had been granted
in that case.
On appeal, the Supreme Court took pains to point out that
the statute means what it says. This type of impeachment rests
only upon prior convictions. A witness may be questioned only
about convictions. He cannot be asked about specific misconduct
or the details of prior offenses, nor may he be queried about an
arrest or an indictment. The court reiterated its statement in
State v. Carite10 that the statute "sought to clothe the defendant
with a mantle of protection against any evidence of prior arrests
or charges for the reason that such information is prejudicial.
It tends to destroy the defendant's credibility in the minds of
the jurors."'1 In the instant case, the court found that the
"mantle of protection was pulled aside."
Having found a substantial violation of the statutory rights
of the defendant, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction
and sentence and remanded the case for a new trial. In so doing,
the court refused to find that the error had been cured as in
State v. Maney,12 because, although the trial judge had sustained
an objection to the reckless driving question, he gave no im-
mediate instruction to the jury to disregard the information it
had received through the question. Rather, the court adopted
the Carite 3 rationale that a reversal is required in order to give
effect to the prohibition of the statute. As a result, prosecutors
are placed on notice that a violation of the mandate of the stat-
ute, uncorrected by a prompt instruction to disregard the offend-
ing question, may well result in a reversal and a new trial. 4
10. 244 La. 928, 155 So. 2d 21 (1963).
11. State v. Perkins, 248 La. 293, 303, 178 So. 2d 255, 259 (1965).
12. 242 La. 223, 135 So. 2d 473 (1961) ; commented on in The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1961-1962 Term -- Evidence, 23 LA. L. REV.
406, 410 (1963).
13. State v. Carite, 244 La. 928, 155 So. 2d 21 (1963). See the discussion of
this case in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1963-1964 Term
-Evidence, 25 LA. L. Rav. 461, 464 (1965). The error in State v. Carite was
the reference to a previous arrest of the accused made by the prosecutor in his
closing argument.
14. Hawthorne, J., with whom MeCaleb, J., joined, dissented on the basis
that the questioning by the State was proper, the objectionable matter having
been injected by defense counsel. The incident occurred in the following manner:
"Q. Were you on or about October 21, 1964, convicted in City Court for reckless
1967]
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In State v. Brent,15 an aggravated rape case, defendant, a
Negro, was asked the following question on cross-examination:
"Was that disorderly conviction as a result of your insulting a
white girl?" The trial judge in overruling the objection stated:
"[T]he District Attorney can go into prior convictions. Not
prior arrests, or prior anything else, just prior convictions."
Noting that neither the answer to the question nor the surround-
ing testimony was made a part of the Bill of Exception, the
Supreme Court held that so far as the bill disclosed, the trial
judge properly restricted the impeachment to prior convictions.
In so holding, the court stated the rule that "the prosecution
may not, however, interrogate defendant concerning details of
prior offenses."' 16 The question here certainly sought details of
the prior disorderly conviction, and the most prejudicial details
imaginable. It would seem that the question in this case was
at least as assertive as that presented in the Perkins case, 7 that
is, the question itself called to the attention of the jury the
highly prejudicial details of the prior conviction. Moreover, the
objection to the question was overruled and hence no question
of instructing the jury to disregard could be presented. It seems
to the writer that this case clearly called for the application of
the Perkins rationale and the proper course would have been
to reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial.
The impeachment of a witness by showing his conviction of
crime is established in criminal cases by statute.18 No such
statute governs in civil cases, and the question is thus presented
as to whether this method of impeachment is applicable in civil
cases. The Court of Appeal (First Circuit) has now answered
this question in the affirmative. In Middleton v. Consolidated
Underwriters,'9 a personal injury case tried before a jury, the
plaintiff was asked on cross-examination whether or not he had
ever been convicted of a crime, and he answered in the affirma-
tive. Counsel then asked the plaintiff to describe the nature of
the crime. Plaintiff's objection to this question was overruled,
driving? (Defense Counsel) : Your Honor, I object to that. The District Attor-
ney well knows it is an improper question. There has been no conviction. The
Court granted a new trial in that case, and the District Attorney knows that.
THE COURT: The objection is maintained. (sic.)"
15. 248 La. 1072, 184 So. 2d 14 (1966).
16. Id. at 1087, 184 So. 2d at 19.
17. State v. Perkins, 248 La. 293, 178 So. 2d 255 (1965).
18. LA. R.S. 15:495 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1952, No. 180, § 1.
19. 185 So.2d 307 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
[Vol. XXVII
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he was instructed to answer and did so, describing a felony
involving dishonesty committed some twenty years before.
In upholding the ruling of the trial court, the court of appeal
stated:
"In every case involving testimonial evidence, the trier of
fact, in this case, the jury, is faced with the question of
whether to believe the testimony of any given witness, or
differently phrased, is faced with the task of assessing the
credibility of the witness. One of the material factors bear-
ing on the issue of credibility is the character of the witness
for truthfulness, and one of the main functions of the cross-
examination is to afford an opportunity to elicit answers
which will impeach the truthfulness or credibility of the
opponent's witnesses. We therefore believe that prior con-
victions of a crime and the nature of the crime may be in-
quired into for impeachment purposes on cross-examina-
tion."20
There is no valid reason why impeachment by conviction for
a previous crime should not be applied to civil cases as well as
criminal. The credibility of a witness is just as crucial a con-
sideration in either type of case, and the trier of fact is certainly
entitled to receive any information that might shed light on the
weight to be attached to particular testimony.
The court of appeal did not content itself with the above
statement of general availability of this method of impeachment
in civil cases, however. In considering the propriety of the
question asking plaintiff to describe the nature of the crime for
which he was convicted, the court said this: "In substance, we
feel that cross-examination of a witness which seeks to elicit
from that witness facts as to the commission of and details of
any crime committed by that witness is proper cross-examina-
tion in that it is as relevant a consideration to be used in evaluat-
ing the credibility of a witness as are many other factors. ' 21
This would appear to broaden the usual scope of this type of
impeachment considerably and to establish a scope at variance
with that applied by the Supreme Court in criminal cases. 22 It
20. Id. at 309.
21. Id. at 310 (emphasis added).
22. "The prosecution may not, lowever, interrogate defendant concerning de-
tails of prior offenses." State v. Brent, 248 La. 1072, 184 So. 2d 14, 1) (1966) ;
see State v. Perkins, 248 La. 293, 178 So. 2d 255 (1965) ; State v. Danna, 170
La. 755, 129 So. 154, 155 (1930).
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seems of doubtful value to allow cross-examination concerning
the commission of and details of a crime where a conviction has
resulted. The late Professor McCormick saw the problem as
follows:
"How far may the cross-examiner go in his inquiries about
convictions? He may ask about the name of the crime com-
mitted, as murder or embezzlement, and the punishment
awarded. It will certainly add to the pungency of the im-
peachment where the crime was an aggravated one if he may
ask about the circumstances, such as in a conviction of
murder whether the victim was a baby, the niece of the wit-
ness. And it is argued that since proof by record is allowable,
and the record would show many of these circumstances, the
cross-examination should at least be permitted to touch all
the facts that the record would. On the whole, however, the
more reasonable practice, minimizing prejudice and distrac-
tion from the issues, is the one generally prevailing that
beyond the name of the crime, the time and place of convic-
tion, and the punishment, further details such as the name
of the victim and the aggravating circumstances may not
be inquired into. '23
It is submitted that an adherence to the McCormick view would
be a more proper and reasonable result. It is also the belief of
this writer that at least in civil cases impeachment by prior con-
viction should be limited to convictions within a reasonable de-
gree of proximity to the time of the trial. To expose a witness
or party in a civil case to cross-examination concerning a crim-
inal conviction "some twenty years before" may well be to de-
feat the ends of justice. The choice between testifying and thus
disclosing the skeleton in the closet and not testifying and thus
risking the defeat of a just claim is indeed a distasteful one.
Justice may indeed be blind, but it need not be both blind and
insensitive.
PHOTOGRAPHs-FOUNDATION FOR ADMISSIBILITY
In Launey v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 24 the Court of Appeal
for the Third Circuit reviewed the authorities concerning the
23. McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 43, at 92 (1954).
24. 169 So. 2d 757 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964); commented on in The Work of
the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1964-1965 Term-Evidence, 26 LA. L.
REv. 606, 618 (1966).
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admissibility of photographs and the nature and extent of the
preliminary foundation to be required. In the course of the
opinion the court said:
"The present photographs, being identified ' as accurate rep-
resentations of young Launey's appearance at the time taken,
are therefore admissible for the purpose of demonstrating
the nature of his initial facial injuries. If the defendant
felt that there were distortions despite the authenticating
evidence, it was open to the defendant to produce testimony
to such effect from other witnesses or from the photographer
himself, presumably being entitled to call the latter under
cross-examination if the pictures had been made at the order
of the plaintiff or his attorney, LSA-C.C.P. Art. 1634."25
In the last term, the Court of Appeal for the First Circuit
had occasion to consider the matter of the foundation necessary
for the admission of photographs. In United States Fid. & Guar.
Co. v. Duet,2 6 the defendants sought to introduce two photo-
graphs depicting the area around an intersection which was the
scene of an automobile collision out of which this case arose.
The foundation for the introduction of these photographs was
limited to a series of questions presented to one of the defend-
ants as to whether or not the photographs correctly depicted
the scene. The objection that "the usual proper foundation had
not been laid for the introduction" was sustained.
The court in. answer to appellants' reliance on the Launey
case as justification for admitting the photographs stated:
"We do not believe that this case can stand as authority for
the introduction of these photographs in the instant case.
Nothing in the record indicates when these photographs were
taken, and this, despite Miss Duet's identification of them,
makes them completely valueless and completely irrelevant
to this suit. These photographs may have been taken three
years prior to the accident, they may have been taken the
day after the accident, or they may have been taken two
years after the accident. In the absence of any testimony
other than that of Miss Duet, we must hold that the identi-
fication and authentication of these photographs adduced by
25. Id. at 760.
26. 177 So. 2d 302 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
1967]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
counsel at the time of the trial falls far short of the normal
requirements set out by the rules of evidence. ' 27
Thus, without citation of authority or any attempt to state
the "normal requirements set out by the rules of evidence," the
court has created some uncertainty as to the application of the
Launej28 case and the requirements of the foundation necessary
to the introduction of photographs. It would seem that the court
ignored the basic distinction between the requirements for ad-
missibility of evidence and the factors which may affect the
weight to be given to a particular piece of evidence by the trier
of fact. In modern times the admissibility of photographs has
rested upon the fact that some witness testifies that the photo-
graph accurately portrays a particular scene. The accuracy of
the photo therefore rests upon the testimony under oath of the
authenticating witness, and this witness, is, of course, subject to
cross-examination and any other evidence may be presented to
diminish the weight to be given the photograph. Professor Mc-
Cormick pointed this out in the following passage:
"As with demonstrative evidence generally, the prime condi-
tion on admissibility is that the photograph be identified by
a witness as a portrayal of certain facts relevant to the issue,
and verified by such a witness on personal knowledge as a
correct representation of these facts. The witness who thus
lays the foundation need not be the photographer nor need
the witness know anything of the time or conditions of the
taking. It is the facts represented, the scene or the object,
that he must know about, and when this knowledge is shown,
he can say whether the photograph correctly portrays these
facts." 29
It is submitted that this is the proper test for the authenti-
cation of photographs, and that this test was met in the instant
case. If the time of taking of these photographs was important
in this case, "The opposing litigant has the right, of course, to
bring out the differences in conditions and circumstances be-
tween the time of the accident and the taking of the picture, both
by cross-examination of the witness presenting the photographs
and by other competent evidence. ' 30
27. Id. at 306.
28. Launey v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 169 So. 2d 757 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1964).
29. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 181, at 387 (1954).
30. Fuqua v. Martin, 40 So. 2d 404, 407 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1949).
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DISCOVERY - CRIMINAL CASES
In State v. Dickson,31 a narcotics case, defendant again at-
tempted to establish a right of discovery in criminal cases. In
this case defendant filed a prayer for oyer seeking any evidence
in typewritten form, on tape recordings, in moving pictures or
otherwise recorded by electronic devices. The state had in its
possession a moving picture apparently showing the accused in
the act of committing the crime charged. In refusing to allow
such discovery the Supreme Court restated its prior holdings in
State v. Dorsey 2 and State v. Pailet :3 "All evidence relating
to a pending criminal trial which is in the possession of the dis-
trict attorney or the police is privileged; and it is not subject to
pre-trial inspection by the accused, an exception to this rule
being written confessions of the accused. ' ' 34 Since the new Code
of Criminal Procedure fails to provide for discovery in criminal
cases, it can be expected that the Supreme Court will maintain
its present attitude barring such discovery.
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ADVERSARY
The courts of appeal have considered two aspects of the right
of a party to call an adverse party as a witness under cross-
examination. In Brown v. Brown35 the court held that a civil
enforcement proceeding under the Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Law3 6 is subject to the rules of civil procedure govern-
ing ordinary civil actions. In this case the wife had obtained a
support order in Oregon and sought enforcement in Louisiana.
Despite the fact that the defendant-husba'nd had no opportunity
to cross-examine the plaintiff-wife in Oregon, the court deter-
mined that the wife could establish her case by calling the hus-
band as a witness under cross-examination. This decision has
the effect of providing a nonresident plaintiff with a much more
effective method of proof than would otherwise be available in
non-support cases.
31. 248 La. 500, 180 So. 2d 403 (1965).
32. 207 La. 928, 22 So. 2d 273 (1945).
33. 246 La. 483, 165 So. 2d 294 (1964).
34. 248 La. 500. 504, 180 So. 2d 403, 404 (1965). The Supreme Court has
also held that a bill of particulars may not be used to obtain a pre-trial revelation
of the evidence to be used by the State or to determine whether the State is pre-
pared to prove certain elements of the crime charged. State v. Bourg, 248 La.
844, 182 So. 2d 510 (1966).
35. 185 So. 2d 286 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
36. LA. R.S. 13:1661-1673 (1950).
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The Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit has reviewed the
question of the use of the testimony of one defendant under
cross-examination against another defendant. In Rancatore v.
Evans,37 the court held that plaintiff may not use the testimony
of an insured given under cross-examination against the insurer,
and further that the adverse testimony of one defendant cannot
be used by that defendant against a co-defendant.
In State v. Brent38 the defense met with failure in an attempt
to create a doctrine whereby a witness in a criminal case could
be called under cross-examination. The Supreme Court, point-
ing out that there exists no authority for the proposition urged
by the defendant, held that when the defendant calls a witness,
not yet called by the state, that witness becomes a defense wit-
ness and may not be cross-examined. In addition, the defense
by calling a witness vouches for the credibility of the witness
and may not impeach the witness except to the limited extent
provided by statute.39 If, under the circumstances of a particular
case, it would be unfair to require the defendant to call a par-
ticular witness possessing important knowledge of relevant facts,
the proper solution would be for the judge to call the person as
a court witness and to make the witness available for examina-
tion as under cross-examination. 40
DISCOVERY-WORK PRODUCT PRIVILEGE
The Code of Civil Procedure41 prohibits the production or
inspection of any writing reflecting the mental impressions, con-
clusions, opinions or theories of either an attorney or an expert,
but does the prohibition extend to the use of interrogatories to
obtain that information? The Court of Appeal for the Fourth
Circuit in Barnett v. Barnett Enterprises, Inc, 42 refused to give
the statute an unduly narrow interpretation and held:
"While the Article 1452 in terms refers only to writings we
are of the opinion that what the Legislature must have in-
tended to forbid was the revelation of any of the conclusions
of experts and not merely the physical viewing or copying
37. 182 So. 2d 102 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
38. 248 La. 1072, 184 So. 2d 14 (1966).
39. LA. R.S. 15:487 (1950).
40. See 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2484 (1940); McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 8
(1954).
41. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1452 (1960).
42. 182 So. 2d 728 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
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of their writings. We cannot hold that the Legislature in-
tended on the one hand to forbid the production or inspection
of any part of the writing that reflects the conclusions or
opinions of an expert and on the other hand to permit such
conclusions or opinions to be obtained by oral depositions or
by answers to interrogatories. To so hold'would lead to the
absurdity of shielding the physical writing from view while
permitting the revelation of its contents, and would result
from a practical standpoint in the complete nullification of
the prohibition contained in Article 1452."
'4 3
The court then specifically held that article 1452 protects a
party against being compelled to disclose in any manner the
conclusions and opinions of experts or attorneys which are ob-
tained or prepared in anticipation of litigation or preparation
for trial.
DEPOSITIONS - USE AT TRIAL
For many years trial attorneys have been concerned with the
best method of presentation of a deposition to a jury where the
deposition may be admitted into evidence.44 The usual method of
reading the deposition, whether by counsel or by the court re-
porter, leaves much to be desired. The credibility factors which
attach to and become an important part of oral testimony are
for the most part lost in a dull reading of a document, often of
considerable length. In Luquette v. Bouillion,4 5 counsel for the
plaintiffs, at considerable cost, I would suspect, showed a con-
siderable degree of ingenuity by having a sound movie film made
at the time a deposition was taken. The deposition was taken in
full conformity with the provisions of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, 46 and the deposition was preserved in writing and tran-
scribed under oath. At trial, the movie film was offered, but
the trial judge refused to permit the jury to view the deposition
in this form and the deposition was read to the jury by the court
reporter. The court of appeal found it unnecessary to express any
views as to plaintiffs' right to show the film on the basis that
no prejudice had been demonstrated. Citing the wide discretion
of the trial court in determining whether to allow the presenta-
43. Id. at 730-31.
44. The use of depositions at trial is governed by LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
art. 14-28 (1960).
45. 184 So. 2d 766 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
46. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 1453, 1455, 1456 (1960).
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tion of evidence through properly authenticated motion pic-
tures,47 the court found no abuse of discretion by the trial judge.
Although the cost factor involved will prevent any extensive
use of this technique for recording depositions, a sound film of
the proceedings, properly authenticated, should certainly be ad-
missible if the deposition is otherwise admissible at trial. This
is the best possible type of substitute for oral testimony in open
court, and to exclude such a film seems to this writer to con-
stitute a clear abuse of the discretion of the trial judge. A party
has the right to present his case in the best possible manner
consistent with the rules of evidence, and this includes the right
to bring before the trier of facts all of the credibility factors
which play such an important part in any fact determination.
To place an unreasonably broad degree of discretion over the
production of evidence in the trial judge makes the task of ade-
quate preparation for trial even more difficult and, as here,
tends to inhibit the resourceful and intelligent use of new and
meritorious techniques.
. 47. Carvell v. Winn, 154 So. 2d 788 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
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